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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
vs. 
FEREIDOUN E. POURMIRZAIE, 
Civil No. 890563-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant asserts jurisdiction in this court under Section 
78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). Mr. Pourmirzaie 
appeals from the Third Judicial District Court's Entry of 
Judgment in favor of Nationwide Insurance Co., on a jury verdict. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting 
the defendant a limiting jury instruction rather than his motion 
for mistrial? 
2. Was the trial court's instruction to the jury regarding 
the standard of proof for punitive damages being "preponderance 
of the evidence" in error when this case came to trial prior to 
the adoption of Utah Code Ann. S 78-18-1 (1953, as amended) which 
set forth "clear and convincing evidence" as the standard of 
proof for punitive damages?" If so, did this instruction sub-
stantially prejudice the defendant or was it just a "harmless 
error"? 
3. Did the trial court err when it awarded attorney's fees 
to the plaintiff pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-56 (1953, as 
amended)? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case is a civil action for fraud on the plaintiff 
insurance company. The defendant/appellant intentionally mis-
represented the facts regarding the condition and disappearance 
of his automobile for the purpose of deceiving plaintiff into 
paying insurance benefits. 
B. Course of Proceedings & Disposition in Court Below 
On January 17 and 18, 1989 a jury trial was held. The jury, 
on special verdict, found that the defendant had defrauded the 
plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff was awarded compensatory 
damages of $29,150.00, prejudgment interest thereon in the amount 
of $12,155.00 as of January 23, 1989, punitive damages of 
$10,000.00, attorney's fees of $8,385.50, and costs of $263.60. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
1. In the opening statement at trial, plaintiff's counsel 
indicated that Mr. Ovard, a witness, would testify as to the 
amount, number and sequence of claims that the defendant had 
filed with the plaintiff in the two years that he was insured 
with them. (Transcript p. 7). 
2. During the trial the defendant was asked whether his 
marriage to his ex-wife was for the purpose of establishing his 
-2-
permanent residency in the United States. The question was 
deemed improper by the trial judge and the answer was stricken. 
(Transcript p. 17). 
3. The plaintiff's counsel in a discussion before the 
bench indicated that these lines of questioning were pursued in 
an attempt to show that the defendant had a practice of routinely 
or habitually defrauding people. This evidence was presented 
pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 406. (Transcript p. 125). 
4. After being recalled as a witness by the defense, Mr. 
Ovard volunteered information pertaining to the defendant's 
activities while being questioned by the defendant's counsel. 
(Transcript p. 167). Since the evidence came in through a 
volunteered statement the trial judge granted the defendant's 
request to have it stricken and the jury admonished. (Transcript 
p. 167). 
5. The defendant alleged that the cumulative effect of the 
volunteered testimony and questions (set forth in statements 1, 2 
& 4) was such that his case was prejudiced. (Transcript p. 170). 
The trial court denied the defendant's motion for mistrial and a 
motion to dismiss the fraud cause of action. (Transcript p. 
173). 
6. Prior to the jury's deliberations, they were instructed 
that in order to find the defendant guilty of fraud they must 
affirmatively conclude that he had knowingly made false represen-
tations to the plaintiff with the intent of causing the plaintiff 
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to rely on those representations. The jury was told that the 
burden of proof for these findings was "clear and convincing 
evidence." (Addendum no. 1). 
7. With regards to punitive damages the jury was 
instructed that they could not hold the defendant liable for such 
damages unless they found that he acted with malicious intent or 
willful disregard for the rights of the plaintiff. The court 
further instructed the jury that the burden of proof for estab-
lishing these damages is "preponderance of the evidence." 
(Addendum no. 2). 
8. To insure that the alleged trial improprieties did not 
prejudice the defendant's case an instruction was given to the 
jury limiting the statements and evidence that they could con-
sider in their deliberations. The instruction directed them to 
consider as evidence only statements by counsel that were made as 
an admission or stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or 
facts" and evidence which was accepted by the court. (Addendum 
no. 3). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The defendant asserts that the lower court erred in refusing 
to grant a mistrial based upon alleged improprieties at trial. In 
his argument however, the defendant has not alleged, let alone 
demonstrated, that the trial judge abused his discretion. In 
addition, it cannot be said that the trial judge abused his 
-4-
discretion by granting a limiting jury instruction rather than 
the motion for mistrial. Therefore, since the record does not 
show an abuse of discretion and because the defendant has not 
demonstrated such an abuse it would be improper for this court to 
overturn the lower court's ruling. 
Next, it is asserted that the jury should have been 
instructed that "clear and convincing evidence" is the standard 
of proof for punitive damages rather than "preponderance of the 
evidence." This argument fails in that it does not recognize 
that "clear and convincing evidence" did not become the standard 
of proof for punitive damages until section 78-18-1 of the Utah 
Code Annotated was enacted in 1989, several months after the 
disposition of this case. 
Moreover, if the jury instruction as to punitive damages was 
in error, it is harmless error since the jury found by "clear and 
convincing" evidence that the defendant had intentionally 
defrauded the plaintiff. Thus, because the jury affirmatively 
decided that the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrated 
that the defendant committed fraud, it is harmless error that 
they did not consider the very same issue again. 
Finally, the trial judge did not err in failing to submit 
the issue of attorney's fees to the jury. The statute that 
confers power upon the court to award such fees grants the court, 
not the jury, express authority to make such determinations. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
MISTRIAL. 
The general rule is that "[t]he granting of a motion for a 
mistrial lies in the sound discretion of the trial judge and his 
ruling should be overturned only when it clearly appears that he 
has abused his discretion." Watklns & Faber v. Whitelev, 592 
P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1979). 
In Watkins, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the decision of 
the trial court denying a motion for a mistrial because of a 
question asked the defendant on cross-examination. In that case, 
as here, the defendant on appeal claimed that the question was 
unfair because it gave the jury a wrong impression of his 
integrity. Id, at 615. The Utah Supreme Court in finding that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant 
a mistrial, declared that "[a] mistrial should be granted only 
when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is 
discharged and a new trial granted." Id. at 616. 
In Wellman v. Noble, 366 P.2d 701 (Utah 1961), where a new 
trial was granted, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the trial 
judge has discretion to grant a new trial when he believes that 
the jury has clearly misapplied the facts or the law or that the 
verdict was the result of passion and prejudice. Id. at 703. 
-6-
Referring to the abuse of discretion test used to overturn 
rulings by trial judges, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Such test depends largely on the reaction and judgment 
of the trial judge. The members of this court and 
other persons might react to the same situation dif-
ferently. This makes it very difficult for a reviewing 
court to determine whether there has been an abuse of 
trial court's discretion. However, since the trial 
judge has seen and heard the witnesses and had a first-
hand view of all the evidence, and the proceedings 
throughout the trial and has ruled on the admissibility 
of the evidence, and instructed the jury on the law 
governing the verdict, and had opportunity of observing 
the tactics of counsel throughout the trial and the 
jury's reaction thereto, his ruling on a motion for a 
new trial should not be overruled unless it clearly 
appears he has abused his discretion. 
Id. at 704. 
In another case, the Utah Supreme Court stated that it "will 
presume that the discretion of the trial court was properly exer-
cised unless the record clearly shows the contrary." Goddard v. 
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-5 (Utah 1984) (citation omitted). 
In the present case there is nothing in the record which 
"clearly" shows that the trial judge abused his discretion in 
denying the defendant's motion for mistrial. Therefore, this 
court should not overturn the trial judge's denial of the Motion 
for Mistrial. 
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING THE 
JURY TO AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
A. AT THE TIME THIS CASE WENT TO TRIAL 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE WAS THE 
STANDARD OF PROOF NECESSARY TO GET PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES. 
At the time this case went to trial, there was no statutory 
provision for awarding punitive damages, nor was there any Utah 
case law setting forth the standard of proof for awarding such 
damages. See U.C.A. 78-18-1 (1953) (amended 1989). 
The traditional standard of proof necessary to award damages 
is "preponderance of evidence." Robinson v. Hreinson, 409 P.2d 
121, 125 (Utah 1966). Prior to 1989, no differentiation was made 
in Utah between general and punitive damages as to the burden of 
proof necessary to prove such damages. See e.g. Atkin Wright & 
Miles v. Mountain States Tele. & Tele. Co., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 
1985); Bundv v. Century Eouip. Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984); 
Amoss v. Broadbent, 514 P.2d 1284 (Utah 1973). Therefore, it was 
not error for the court to instruct the jury as to the standard 
of proof being "preponderance of evidence." 
B. EVEN IF THE STANDARD OF PROOF FOR PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES IS "CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE" 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT THE STANDARD IS 
"PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE" WAS A 
HARMLESS ERROR. 
Even if the lower court erred in instructing the jury as to 
the burden of proof for punitive damages it is a harmless error. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61 states that: 
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No error in either the admission or the exclusion 
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or 
order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by 
any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial 
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless 
refusal to take such action appears to the court incon-
sistent with substantial justice. The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
In the present case, if the jury instruction as to punitive 
damages is in error it is not substantial and prejudicial. The 
burden of proof for insurance fraud is clear and convincing 
evidence. Thus, to find the defendant guilty of insurance fraud 
the jury had to find that the evidence "clearly and convincingly" 
demonstrated that the defendant had defrauded the plaintiff. 
Since the jury had already found that the evidence presented at 
trial "clearly and convincingly" proved that the defendant 
intentionally lied, it can be asserted that punitive damages are 
justified even though the jury was not instructed as to that 
standard of proof. Certainly evidence which proves that the 
defendant intentionally lied so as to defraud the plaintiff 
constitutes knowing and reckless indifference towards the rights 
of others. Accordingly, such evidence is sufficient to justify 
punitive damages. 
Therefore, even if the jury instruction as to the burden of 
proof for punitive damages was in error it is harmless error, 
thus this court should not reverse the lower court's award of 
punitive damages. 
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POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING THE 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Attorney's fees are not awarded unless they are contrac-
tually or statutorily provided for. Western Casualty & Surety 
Co. v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1980). In the present 
case, the request for attorney's fees was based upon Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-27-56 (1953, as amended): 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action 
or defense to the action was without merit 
and not brought or asserted in good faith 
The defendant asserts that since he requested a trial by 
jury that all the issues in this case, including that of 
attorney's fees, must be decided by the jury unless an agreement 
between parties has been made, which agreement must appear on the 
record. In making this assertion the defendant relies upon Rule 
39 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which in part reads: 
The trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, 
unless 
(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by 
written stipulation made in open court and entered in 
the record, consent to trial by the court sitting 
without a jury, or 
(2) The court upon motion or of its own initia-
tive finds that a right of trial by jury on some or all 
of those issues does not exist . . . 
In hinging his case upon Rule 39 the defendant fails to recognize 
that Subsection (a)(2) is applicable. Subsection (a)(2) plainly 
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states that when there is no right to a jury trial on a parti-
cular issue the court and not the jury will dispose of that 
issue. Id. 
Particularly noteworthy is the distinction in Rule 39 
between the right to trial by "jury" or by "the court". Id. 
This distinction is important to the case at hand since the 
statutory provision which confers the right to attorney's fees 
upon the plaintiff indicates that "the court [not the jury] shall 
award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the 
court determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit . . . ." Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-56 (1953, as 
amended) (emphasis added). In other words, the right to have a 
jury determine the issue of attorney's fees does not exist since 
the statutory provision which provides for such fees specifies 
that "the court" shall make the determination of that issue. 
Thus, the lower court did not err in not submitting this issue to 
the jury. 
Furthermore, on the Special Verdict form, the Jury found 
that defendant had defrauded plaintiff. In order to do so, the 
Jury found that defendant lied about his auto theft claim. It is 
hard to imagine a defense with less merit than one which is based 
upon intentional lies, nor could such a defense, by any stretch 
of the imagination, have been brought or asserted in good faith. 
In Toplk v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1987) the trial 
court's decision to award attorney's fees was affirmed because of 
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findings that the defense was partially in bad faith and the 
defendant's testimony constituted "willful falsehoods." The 
record supported findings of the trial court that the defendant 
attempted to avoid liability by testifying falsely. Since the 
same is true in the case at hand, attorney's fees are most 
appropriate. 
In Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983) the court set 
out the standard for awarding attorney's fees under Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-27-56 (1953, as amended). Two elements are required in 
addition to being a prevailing party. First, the claim must be 
"without merit." The court defined "without merit" as "frivo-
lous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in law 
or fact." Certainly, lies have little weight or importance and 
without a doubt they have no basis in law or fact. The second 
element requires that the action or defense be lacking in "good 
faith." The court defined "good faith" as: 
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the 
activities in question; 
(2) No intent to take unconscionable advantage of 
other; and 
(3) No intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the 
activities in question will, [sic] hinder, delay, 
or defraud others. 
Cadv, 671 P.2d at 151. The court stated that if only one of the 
foregoing three factors is lacking, good faith is absent. In the 
case at hand, all three factors are lacking. Fraud could never 
equate with "good faith." 
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CONCLUSION 
First, since the record does not indicate that the trial 
judge abused his discretion and because the defendant has not 
established an abuse of discretion the trial court's denial of 
the Motion for Mistrial should not be overturned. 
Second, it was not error for the trial court to instruct the 
jury that "preponderance of evidence" was the standard of proof 
for punitive damages. Even if the lower court did err in so 
instructing the jury it is a harmless error. Therefore, this 
court should not reverse the lower court's award of punitive 
damages. 
Finally, the statute which provides for attorney's fees in 
civil actions expressly provides for the court to make any and 
all determinations with regards to that issue, not the jury. 
Furthermore, attorney's fees were appropriate in the present 
case. 
Consequently, this court should not reverse or modify any of 
the lower court's rulings or decisions regarding any of the 
issues raised by the defendant op appeal. 
DATED this £~* day of U/X^^, , 1990. 
5NOW, CWISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Plaintiff-
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ADDENDUM 
1. Jury Instructions 
2. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
3. Statutes — Utah Code Ann. 
4. Utah Rules of Evidence 
ADDENDUM 1 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 
You should not consider as evidence any statement of 
counsel made during the trial, unless such statement was made 
as an admission or stipulation conceding the existence of a 
fact or facts. 
You must not consider for any purpose any offer of 
evidence that was rejected, or any evidence that Was stricken 
out by the court; such matter is to be treated as though you 
never had known of it. 
You are to decide this case solely upon the evidence 
that has been received by the court, and the inferences that 
you may reasonably draw therefrom, and such presumptions as 
the law deduces therefrom, as noted in these instructions, and 
in accordance with the law as herein stated. 
INSTRUCTION NO. f ZL 
By a preponderance of the evidence, as that term is 
used in these instructions, is meant that which to your minds 
is of the greater weight. The evidence preponderates to the 
side which, to your minds, seems to be the most convincing and 
satisfactory. The preponderance of the evidence is not alone 
determined by the number of witnesses, nor the amount of the 
testimony, but the convincing character of the testimony weighed 
by the impartial minds of the jury. 
INSTRUCTION NO . 13 
The essential elements in a fraud case are: 
(1) That a representation was made; 
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact; 
(3) which was false; 
(4) which the representor knew to be false. 
(5) Intending to induce plaintiff to rely and act upon 
the misrepresentation; 
(6) That plaintiff/ in fact, was induced to rely and by 
its actions did rely upon the representation. 
(7) That plaintiff's reliance upon the representation 
was reasonable and without knowledge of its falsity. 
(8) That the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of 
its actions in reliance upon the representation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The party with the burden of proof on the issue of fraud has 
the burden of proving all the elements of its claim on that issue 
to you by clear and convincing evidence. In this case Plaintiff 
has the burden of proof and if you conclude that Plaintiff has 
failed to establish its claim by clear and convincing evidence, 
you must decide against it on the issue you are considering. 
What does "Clear and Convincing Evidence" mean? Clear and 
convincing evidence is a more exacting standard than proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence, or you need believe only that a 
party's claim is more likely true than not true. On the other 
hand, "Clear and Convincing" proof is not as high a standard as 
the Burden of Proof applied in criminal cases, which is proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Clear and convincing proof leaves no substantial doubt in 
your mind. It is proof that establishes in your mind, not only 
that the proposition at issue is probable, but also that it is 
highly probable. It is enough that the party with the burden of 
proof establishes his claim beyond any "substantial doub-t";. 
Plaintiff does not have to dispel every "reasonable doubt". 
The burden of proof refers to the quality and persuasiveness 
of the evidence, not to the number of witnesses or documents. In 
determining whether a claim has been proved by clear and 
convincing evidence, you may consider the relevant testimony of 
all witnesses, regardless of whom may have called them, and all 
the relevant exhibits received in evidence, regardless of who may 
have produced them. 
INSTRUCTION NO. //C, 
In addition to compensatory damages/ under certain cir-
cumstances the law permits the jury to award an injured party 
punitive damages. Punitive damages punish a wrongdoer and 
serve as a warning to others not to engage in such conduct. 
The jury may award a plaintiff punitive damages in this 
case if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 
plaintiff has been damaged as a result of acts or omissions of 
the defendant done either willfully or maliciously/ or with 
reckless indifference toward and disregard of that plaintiff's 
rights. An act or omission is done willfully if it is done 
intentionally. An act or a failure to act is "maliciously" 
done if it is prompted or accompanied by ill will/ spite, or 
grudge. "Recklessly" means wantonly, with indifference to 
consequences. If a person makes a representation without 
knowing whether it is true or not, or makes it without regard 
to its truth or falsity or to its possible consequences, he may 
be found to have made the representation recklessly. 
ADDENDUM 2 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 39 
Right preserved. 
—Appeal from industrial commission. 
This trial rule is not applicable to trial de 
novo in the district court on appeal from indus-
trial commission's decision on a sex discrimi-
nation in employment case Beehive Medical 
Elecs., Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 5S3 P.2d 53 
(Utah 1978). 
—Court's discretion. 
In circumstances where doubt exists as to 
whether a cause should be regarded as one in 
equity or one m law, wherein the party can 
insist on a jury as a matter of nght, the tnal 
court should have some discretion and may ex-
amine the nature of the nghts asserted and the 
remedies sought m the light of the facts of the 
case to ascertain which predominates and, 
from that determination, make the appropnate 
order as to a jury or nonjury tnal. Corbet v. 
Cox, 30 Utah 2d 361, 517 P.2d 1318 (1974). 
Waiver. 
—Failure to make written demand. 
Failure to make a wntten demand for a jury 
tnal upon the opposing party waives any error 
in a court's failure to grant a jury tnal. Gasser 
v. Home, 557 P.2d 154 (Utah 1976). 
Cited in Stickle v. Union Pac. R.R., 122 
Utah 477, 251 P.2d 867 (1952), Best v Huber, 
3 Utah 2d 177, 281 P.2d 208 (1955); Hansen v. 
Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 10, 
57 to 69, 71, 81, 82, 84 to 89 
C.J.S. — 50 C J S Junes §§ 10, 84 to 113. 
A.L.R. — Obtaining jury tnal m eminent 
domain, waiver, 12 A.L.R.3d 7. 
Right in equity suit to jury tnal of counter-
claim involving legal issue, 17 A L R.3d 1321. 
Issues in garnishment as triable to court or 
to jury, 19 A.L.R.3d 1393 
Statute reducing number of jurors as viola-
tive of nght to tnal by jury, 47 A.L.R3d 895 
Authonty of state court to order jury tnal in 
civil case where jury has been waived or not 
demanded by parties 9 AX.R.4th 1041. 
Right to jury tnal m stockholder's denvative 
action, 32 A.L.R4th 1111 
Right to jury tnal in action for declaratory 
relief in state court, 33 A.L.R 4th 146 
Jury tnal waiver as binding on later state 
civil tnal, 48 A.L.R.4th 747 
Paternity proceedings nght to jury tnal, 51 
A.L.R 4th 565 
Right to jury tnal in action for retaliatory 
discharge from employment, 52 AX.R.4th 
1141 
Right to jury tnal in state court divorce pro-
ceedings, 56 A.L.R. 4th 955 
Validity of law or rule requiring state court 
party who requests jury tnal m cml case to 
pay costs associated with jury, 68 AXJL4th 
343. 
Rule 38 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 
waived nght to jury tnal as revived by 
amended or supplemental pleadings, 18 A.L-R. 
Fed 754 
Key Numbers. — Jury «=» 10, 25 to 28. 
Rule 39. Trial by jury or by the court. 
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, 
the action shall be designated upon the register of actions as a jury action. The 
trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless 
(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed 
with the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in 
the record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury, or 
(2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of 
trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist, or 
(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial. 
(b) By the court Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule 
38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to 
demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might have been made of 
right, the court in its discretion upon motion may order a tnal by a jury of any 
or all issues. 
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent In all actions not triable of right 
by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with 
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an advisory jury or, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a 
jury whose verdict has the same efifect as if tnal by jury had been a matter of 
right. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 39, F.R.C.P 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Advisory jury 
—Equity 
Tnal by consent. 
—Equity 
Motion for directed verdict. 
Tnal by court 
—Waiver of court tnal 
—Waiver of jury tnal 
Tnal by jury 
—Grant of jury tnal 
Absence of demand 
—Right 
Quiet title action 
Cited 
Advisory jury. 
—Equity. 
When there is a demand for a jury tnal in an 
equity case, the jury will serve only in an advi-
sory capacity unless both parties have clearly 
consented to accept a jury verdict Romrell v 
Zions First Natl Bank, 611 P2d 392 (Utah 
1980) 
Tnal court did not commit prejudicial error 
by allowing a jury to sit in an equity proceed-
ing where the jury was retained merely as an 
advisory jury to consider the sole question of 
the reasonableness of plaintiffs reliance on de-
fendant's act Tolboe Constr Co v Staker Pav-
ing & Constr Co, 682 P 2d 843 (Utah 1984) 
Tnal by consent 
—Equity. 
Motion for directed verdict 
Where the case was essentially one in equity 
but the parties and court appeared to have con-
sented to presenting their case to a jury whose 
verdict would have "the same effect as if tnal 
by jury had been a matter of nght," under Sub-
division (c), the determination of whether a di-
rected verdict was proper was to be tested by 
the same rules governing cases at law Willard 
v. Milne Inv Co. v Cox, 580 P.2d 607 (Utah 
1978). 
Trial by court 
—Waiver of court trial. 
Even though former statute providing for 
tnal by court in absence of demand for jury 
was couched in mandatory terms, and a party 
might have an absolute nght to have the is-
sues tned by the court, the nght could be 
waived, as by proceeding to tnal before a jury 
Houston Real Estate Inv Co v Hechler, 47 
Utah 215, 152 P 726 (1915) 
—Waiver of jury trial. 
Where it did not appear that any demand for 
a jury tnal was made, or that any objection or 
exception was made at any time dunng tnal 
against nght of the court to try the case with-
out a jury, it would be presumed on appeal that 
a tnal by jury was waived Perego v Dodge, 9 
Utah 3, 33 P 221 (1893), affd, 163 U.S 160,16 
S Ct. 971, 41 L Ed 113 (1896) 
Trial by jury. 
—Grant of jury triaL 
Absence of demand. 
Court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
jury tnal to defendant, under this rule, over 
plaintiffs objections although defendant had 
not made proper demand for jury tnal under 
Rule 38, where plaintiff was not prejudiced 
thereby James Mfg Co v Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 
210, 390 P2d 127 (1964) 
—Right 
iet title action. 
This rule gives the nght to have any legal 
issue of fact tned by a jury upon proper de-
mand, and plaintiff in an action to quiet title to 
mining claims was entitled to a jury tnal on 
issues of fact Holland v Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 
327 P.2d 250 (1958) 
Cited in Randall v Tracy Collins Trust Co., 
6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P 2d 480 (1956) 
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Cited in Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 299, 
241 P.2d 462 (1952); Board of Educ. v. Cox, 16 
Utah 2d 20, 395 P.2d 55 (1964); Parker v. 
Rolfeon, 525 P.2d 612 (Utah 1974); Dynapac, 
Inc. v. Innovations, Inc., 550 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1976); Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123 
(Utah 1977); Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., 
589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978); Peay v. Peay, 607 
P.2d 841 (Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. 
Osborne, 622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981); Kohler v. 
Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); St. 
Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982); 
Kanzee v. Kanzee, 668 P.2d 495 (Utah 1983); 
Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d 613 
(Utah 1984); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 
(Utah 1985); In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d 
1345 (Utah 1986); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 
(Utah 1986); Myers v. Garff, 655 F. Supp. 1021 
(D. Utah 1987); Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053 
(Utah 1987); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 
1318 (Utah 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d 
1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Blodgett v. Zions 
First Natl Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 
131 (Utah 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§§ 200, 671 et seq. 
C.J.S. —49CJ.S. Judgments §§ 228 et seq., 
237. 
AJLR. — Incompetence of counsel as ground 
for relief from state court civil judgment, 64 
A.L.R.4th 323. 
Relief from judicial error by motion under 
F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(1), 1 A.L.R. Fed. 771. 
Propriety of conditions imposed in granting 
relief from judgment under Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b), 3 A.L.R. Fed. 956. 
Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure authorizing correction of 
clerical mistakes and judgments, orders or 
other parts of the records and errors therein 
arising from oversight or omission, 13 A.L.R. 
Fed. 794. 
Construction and application of Rule 60(b)(5) 
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizing 
relief from final judgment where its prospec-
tive application is inequitable, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 
309. 
Independent actions to obtain relief from 
judgment, order, or proceeding under Rule 
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
53 A.L.R. Fed. 558. 
Lack of jurisdiction, or jurisdictional error, 
as rendering federal district court judgment 
"void* for purposes of relief under Ruie 60(b)(4) 
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 A.L.R. 
Fed. 831. 
Effect of filinr of notice of appeal on motion 
to vacate judgr.snt under Rule 60(b) of Federal 
Rules of Civil .Procedure, 62 A.L.R. Fed. 148. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment *=» 294 et seq., 
306, 307. 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error 
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturb-
ing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 61, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Admission of evidence. 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Burden of showing error. 
Exclusion of evidence. 
Instructions. 
Judgment presumed valid. 
Judicial notice. 
Liability for costs. 
Notice of appeal. 
Party creating or approving error. 
Refusal to direct verdict. 
Refusal to grant mistrial. 
Service of summons. 
Substantiality of error. 
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ADDENDUM 3 
78-2-2 JUDICIAL CODE 
substituted "determines" for "decides" at the sentence of Subsection (3); deleted "additional" 
end of the fourth sentence. before "duties" in Subsection (5); deleted "where 
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, not inconsistent with the law" following "chief 
1990, deleted "next" after "January" and made justice" and added "as consistent with the law" 
punctuation changes in Subsection (2); deleted
 a t the end of Subsection (6). 
"not" following "chief justice may" in the third 
78-2-2, Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into eflfect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
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Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. of Subsection (4 Kg); and made minor stylistic 
1986, ch. 47, i 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988, changes. 
ch. 248, { 5; 1989, ch. 67, i 1. The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- 1989, added "and Forestry" at the end of Sub-
ment, effective April 25,1988, substituted *for- section (3Xe)(iii); rewrote Subsection (4)(a) 
mal adjudicative proceedings" for "cases" in which read nfirst degree and capital felony con-
:;absection (3)(e); added Subsection (3)(f); re- victions"; substituted w(ff for n(i)w at the end of 
designated former Subsections (3)(f) to (3)(i) ac- Subsection (4)(g); and made minor stylistic 
cordingly; substituted n(i)w for"K(h)w at the end changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS section will be considered insufficient; instead 
the appropriate subsection must be included to 
Docketing statement. ^ ^
 t h e S u p r e m e ^ ^ thai i t ^ o r i g i n a l 
-feference to subsection. appellate jurisdiction over the case. Gregory v. 
U l t e a
' Fourthwest Invs., Ltd., 735 P.2d 33 (Utah 
Docketing statement 1987). 
—Reference to subsection. 
In all cases appealed after January 1, 1987, C l t e d m C o n d e r v- A L Williams & Assocs., 
reference in the docketing statement to this 7 3 9 R 2 d 6 3 4 (:Utaii C t APP- 1 9 8 7 )-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals, 
1988 Utah L. Rev. 150. 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Stewart v. Coffinan, 748 P.2d 579 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal 
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137. 
78-2-5. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 248, § 50 repeals ing that the Supreme Court is always open, 
§ 78-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provid- effective April 25, 1988. 
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS 78-18-2 
78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards — Section in-
applicable to DUI cases — Division of award with 
state. 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be 
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of 
the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of 
Subsection (a) do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising out 
of the tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily intoxi-
cated or under the influence of any drug or combination of alcohol and 
drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44. 
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible 
only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made. 
(3) In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50% of 
the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment 
of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for deposit into 
the General Fund. 
History: C. 1953, 78-18-1, enacted by L. punitive damages that arise on or after May 1, 
1989, ch- 237, § 1. 1989 
Applicability. — Laws 1989, ch. 237, § 4 Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 237, § 4 
provides that the act applies to all claims for makes the act effective on May 1, 1989. 
78-18-2. Drug exception. 
(1) Punitive damages may not be awarded if a drug causing the claimant's 
harm: 
(a) received premarket approval or licensure by the Federal Food and 
Drug Administration under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 
U.S.C. Section 301 et seq. or the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 
Section 201 et seq.; 
(b) is generally recognized as safe and effective under conditions estab-
lished by the Federal Food and Drug Administration and applicable regu-
lations, including packaging and labeling regulations. 
(2) This limitation on liability for punitive damages does not apply if it is 
shown by clear and convincing evidence that the drug manufacturer know-
ingly withheld or misrepresented information required to be submitted to the 
Federal Food and Drug Administration under its regulations, which informa-
tion was material and relevant to the claimant's harm. 
History. C. 1953, 78-13-2, enacted by L. 237, § 3 provides that if any provision of the 
1989, ch. 237, J 2. act, or the application of any provision to any 
Applicability. — Laws 1989, ch. 237, § 4 person or circumstance, is held invalid, the re-
provides that the act applies to all claims for mainder of the act is to be given effect without 
punitive damages that arise on or alter May 1, the invalid provision or application. 
1989. Effective Dates, — Laws 1989, ch. 237, § 4 
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1989, ch. makes the act effective on May 1, 1989. 
135 
78-27-50 JUDICIAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Credit card issuer's liability, un-
der state laws, for wrongful billing, cancella-
tion, dishonor, or disclosure, 53 A.L.R.4th 231. 
78-27-50. Financial information privacy — Act inapplica-
ble to certain official investigations. 
Nothing in this act shall ap?iy where an examination of said records is a 
part of an official investigation by any local police, sheriff, city attorney, 
county attorney, the attorney general, the Department of Public Safety, the 
Office of Recovery Services of the Department of Human Services, or the 
Department of Commerce. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 1; 1990, ch. The 1990 amendment by ch. 183, effective 
133, § 18; 1990, ch. 183, § 57. April 23, 1990, substituted "Office of Recovery 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- Services, Department of Human Services" for 
ment by ch. 133, effective April 23, 1990, sub- bureau
 0f Recovery Services, Department of 
stituted the Department of Public Safety, the Social Services " 
Bureau of Recovery Services of the Depart- «« . .. ., , , ., 
ment of Human Services, or the Department of ^ f*0* * ** ° * ° recoiled by the 
Commerce" for "or the state Department of ° f f i c e of Le^aUve Research and General 
Public Safety, or the Bureau of Recovery Ser- Counsel, 
vices, Department of Social Services." 
78-27-5L Inherent risks of skiing — Public policy. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AXJL — Ski resort's liability for skier's in-
juries resulting from condition of ski run or 
slope, 55 A.L.R.4th 632. 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or de-
fense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except 
under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees 
under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1; 1988, ch. 92, following "civil actions" in Subsection (1); sub-
S 1. stituted "shall" for "may* following "the court" 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- in Subsection (1); added "except under Subsec-
ment, effective April 25. 1988, inserted the tion (2)" at the end of Subsection (1) and added 
Subsection designation (1); deleted "where not Subsection (2). 
otherwise provided by statute or agreement" 
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ADDENDUM 4 
Rule 406 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
have him relate what that reputation is. State 
v. Goodhffe, 578 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1978). 
Witness' individual opinon is inadmissible as 
evidence of person's reputation. State v. 
Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1978). 
Victim's reputation. 
In rape prosecution, where evidence shows 
that the association between the parties came 
about in a sociable and peaceable manner and 
Utah Law Review. — Rape Victim Con-
frontation — 1985, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 3, 687. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§ 340 et seq.; 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses § 668. 
CJ.S. — 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 676 to 
681; 32 C.J.S. Evidence §§ 422 to 437; 98 
CJ.S. Witnesses § 498 et seq. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable 
to Rule 49, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The 
substance of Rule 50, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) providing for the method of proof of 
habit or custom and allowing evidence in the 
form of opinion as well as specific instances 
when the number of instances is sufficient to 
Utah Law Review. — Uncharged Miscon-
duct Evidence in Child Abuse Litigation, 1988 
Utah L. Rev. 479. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§ 303. 
C.J.S. — 32 CJ.S. Evidence § 582. 
A.L.R. — Pedestrian, admissibility of evi-
dence of habit, customary behavior, or reputa-
tion as to care of on question of his care at time 
of collision with motor vehicle giving rise to his 
injury or death, 28 A.L.R.3d 1293. 
Motor vehicle driver or occupant, admissibil-
a transition to violence is claimed, there ig*a 
genuine and critical issue as to consent so thai 
the probative value of the victim's reputation 
as to moral character outweighs the negative 
factors and justifies admission of evidence as to 
her reputation. State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466 
(Utah 1975). 
Cited in State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 
1988). 
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of 
trial court's limiting number of character or 
reputation witnesses, 17 A.L.R.3d 327. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 375 to 
381; Evidence •» 106,152,155(2), Witnesses *» 
340 et seq. 
warrant a finding of habit or custom was dej 
leted by Congress with a note by the House 
Judiciary Committee that the method of proof 
should be left with the Court Compare Rule 
406(b), Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974), 
which is Rule 406(b0 as originally promulgated 
by the United States Supreme Court. 
lty of evidence of habit, customary behavior, or 
reputation as to care of on question of his care 
at time of occurrence giving rise to his injury 
or death, 29 A.L.R.3d 791. 
Proof of mailing by evidence of business or 
office custom, 45 A.L.R4th 476 
Admissibility of defendant's evidence of in-
dustry custom or practice m strict liability ac-
tion, 47 A.L.R.4th 621. 
Habit or routine practice evidence under 
Uniform Evidence Rule 406, 64 A.L.R.4th 567. 
Key Numbers. — Evidence *» 138. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 406. Habit; routine practice. 
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organiza-
tion, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewit-
nesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a 
particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice/. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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